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Introduction 
As Shulamit Reinharz demonstrates in her book Feminist Methods in Social Research 
, 
(1992), 'Feminist Social Research' is an idea that feminists have conceptualized in numerous 
ways. Feminists define it as (among other things): research done from a feminist perspective 
(Reinharz 1992), research about women's oppression (Kelly et aI1991), research grounded in and 
starting from the everyday lives of women (Smith 1987a), research that places the social 
construction of gender at the center of its analysis (Lather 1991) and research that generates its 
problematics from women's experiences (Harding 1987). Some argue that there is a distinct 
feminist method (Kasper 1994), while others argue that, though there is no specific feminist 
method, there are specifically feminist methodologies (Jayarante et al 1991). Some of these 
debates regarding the status of feminist research are primarily focused on the theoretical or 
substantive positions offeminists and involve contention about the 'proper' approach to feminism 
(e.g. liberal vs. Third World vs. radical vs. Marxist feminisms). Other debates focus around the 
nature of research itself. These debates are organized around the subjects of epistemology, 
methodology and research methods-- it is to this latter set of debates that I turn in this paperl. 
In the past twenty years feminist theorists and researchers have produced a wide body of 
literature assessing feminism's relationship with conventional epistemologies and research 
1 Theoretical debates and controversy over the definition offentinism certainly cannot be separated entirely from 
epistemological or methodological concerns. In some cases, snch as ethnomethodology for instaoce, theory and 
methodology are directly related and theoretical positions inform all epistemological positions (and vice-versa). 
Fentinist and sociological theory, therefore, must be a part of any epistemological or methodological discussion. I 
make the distinction between the theoretical/substantive debates and those in epistemology and methodology, then, 
simply to stress that theoretical debates, in this paper, will primarily be viewed from the lens of what this will 
mean for our understaodings of science, knowledge, sociology or research methods. 
2 
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methodologies. In positions ranging from attempts to fit women/feminism into dominant research 
traditions to completerejections of positivist epistemology and the quantitative methods generally 
associated with them, feminists confront a wide range of issues including the concepts of 
objectivity, rationality, the role of the researcher, and the strengths and weaknesses of various 
quantitative and qualitative research methQds. Drawing on other critiques of positivist 
epistemology and traditional research methods, from such traditions as ethnomethodology, critical 
theory and most recently postmodem and post-structural theories, feminists both assess the 
viability of these theories for feminist research projects and expand these theories by the inclusion 
of gendered critiques of epistemological and methodological traditions. 
Epistemology, methodology and research methods can be viewed as three different levels 
of analysis all dealing with the same issues: the nature and production of knowledge and research. 
Though there are logical connections between debates and positions in epistemology, 
methodology and research methods, too often these three subjects have remained separate from 
one another with very little dialogue between them. Theorists have produced a wide range of 
literature in the field offeminist epistemology regarding the concepts of objectivity, rationality, 
experience and science taking various positions on positivist and postmodernist epistemologies 
(see for instance Alcoffand Potter 1993; Lennon and Whitford 1994). These debates, however, 
are seldom connected explicitly to what this means for actually performing social research. 
Though they have produced fascinating results among themselves, how they specifically relate to 
methodology and methods is rarely made clear. Can, for example, an anti-realist, anti-objectivist 
epistemological position be useful for feminist sociological research? Do these epistemological 




















work with them? How can these interesting epistemological positions be translated into equally 
fruitful methodologies? 
In this paper I examine some of the primary debates in feminist epistemology, with a 
particular emphasis on postmodem epistemological positions, asking what these mean for doing 
research. One central question I ask is 'what role should the concept of objectivity have in 
feminist sociological research?'. I argue for a reformulation of the concept of objectivity that, 
sympathetic with feminist postmodemism, rejects the ideal of value-neutrality in research, but that 
also rejects relativism and subjectivism. Keeping these debates in mind, I will examine debates 
regarding feminist methodology and the question of whether or not there is a specific feminist 
method or methodology. I argue against the existence of a distinct 'feminist method' and reject 
the polarization between quantitative and qualitative research that dominates much of this debate .. 
4 
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Feminist Epistemology 
Feminist theorists/researchers have engaged in a wide variety of epistemological debates. 
One of the most significant of these is in regards to what relationship feminist research should 
have with positivist epistemology. Canfeininist social research be effective within this 
epistemological framework? Should feminists attempt to use conventional epistemology to guide 
their research and eliminate masculinist bias or should central concepts of positivism such as 
objectivity and value neutrality be rejected? Can a postmodernist epistemological position be 
compatible with conducting sociological research? 
Sandra Harding (1986; 1991), prominent analyst of the relationship between science, 
epistemology, and feminism, identifies three major strains offeminist epistemology: feminist 
empiricism, feminist standpoint epistemology, and feminist postmodernism2 These three forms of 
feminist epistemology approach issues of positivism and objectivity in distinctly different ways. 
Feminist empiricists (e.g. Millman and Kanter 1975; Cancian 1992; Molm 1993) argue that sexism 
and androcentrism in conventional sociological research is the result of bias on the part of 
researchers. These social biases, they argue, are "correctable by stricter adherence to the existing 
methodological norms of scientific inquiry"(Harding 1986: 24). They argue that traditional 
concepts such as objectivity are not the problem; it is a lack of objectivity that needs to be 
eradicated. Feminist standpoint theorists (e.g. Smith 1987; Collins 1991; Hartsock 1987; Stanley 
2 These three frameworks are neither entirely discrete from one another (for instance there are postmodern feminist 
standpnint theorists) nor homogenous categories (there are many disagreements among feminist postmodemists). 
Though classiJYing feminist epistemological positions according to one of these three categories is not free from 
problems and can hide some of the more subtle differences between them (differences I highlight throughout the 
paper) I do think Harding's tripartite model provides a useful framework to uoderstand the major divisions in 
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and Wise 1990, 1993) argue that areas of inquiry in sociology have traditionally been defined 
through the viewpoint of those in the most dominant positions in society (i. e. those of 
upper/middle class, white, heterosexual, men). This has caused, they argue, an extremely skewed 
view o! society in which the status quo is treated as either natural or functional by those who gain 
the most by the maintenance of contempOfary social and economic relations. Alternatively, the 
standpoint theorists argue, research should begin from the standpoint of women and other 
marginalized people who occupy the positions of outsiders/within able to see more critically and 
perceptively some important aspects of social organization (Collins 1990a; 1990b). Finally, 
feminist postmodernists (e.g. Hekman 1990; Fraser and Nicholson 1990; Haraway 1988) offer an 
extreme critique of conventional epistemology. They argue that all 'knowledge' is necessarily 
partial and socially situated, that value neutrality is never possible, and that concepts such as truth 
and objectivity must be deconstructed. 
These three epistemological positions offer very different understandings of such concepts 
as rationality, objectivity, c&cience and even gender. A wide range of critiques have been leveled 
against all of these positions-- both from within feminism and from without3 Critics accuse 
feminist empiricists of being too foundationalist and of offering a too lenient critique of 
conventional research, able to deal with only the symptoms and not the causes of 
androcentric/sexist research (Haraway 1987; Hekman 1990). Many charge feminist standpoint 
theorists with essentialism, an inattentiveness to differences among women and an unsophisticated 
understanding of 'experience' (Haraway 1987; Longino 1993; Bar-On 1993). To many, the 
3 Though uot exclusively, I will primarily use examples offeminist criticisms of other feminist epistemological 
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feminist postmodernist position seems utterly relativist and nihilist, having little connections to the 
actual necessities of doing research (Walby 1991; DiStefano 1990; Shelton and Agger 1993). 
In the epistemology section of this paper, I explore the significance of these varying 
positions, connecting these to methodological concerns. Using the debates over the concept of 
objectivity to frame my analysis, I first examine the feminist empiricist and feminist postmodernist 
positions, which represent the two poles of this debate within feminism. The feminist empiricists, 
I argJle, are not sufficiently attentive to the inevitable political and social investedness of their own 
(and all) research. The feminist empiricists, have, though, and will continue to have, an important 
corrective influence upon the most flagrant sexism and androcentrism in sociological research; 
though I cannot agree fully with their epistemological assumptions, the importance of their project 
of critiquing dominant research from within the epistemological framework of that research 
should not be underestimated. I will argue for many of the epistemological positions of the 
feminists postmodernists, drawing particularly on the works of Harding (1986; 1991; 1993) and 
Haraway (1987; 1990), stressing, however, that postmodernists must not replace objectivism with 
subjectivism or fall into epistemological relativism. Finally I will examine the arguments of 
feminist standpoint theorists who offer a variety of positions on debates regarding objectivity and 
'women's experience' (some of which are highly foundationalist while others are distinctly 
postmodernist) to show a more applied example of what is at stake for social research in these 
epistemological debates. F,eminist standpoint theory, I argue, can offer a useful framework from 
which to begin some research-- but only if it conceptualizes difference within the category of 
women (particularly race, class and sexuality) at the very heart of its theories, and only if a 

















Thus far I have been using the term 'positivism' in a fairly general and undefined way. 
Before I present critiques of positivism I feel it is important to more fully define the ways in which 
I will be using this term. The term 'positivism' can be used to signify a variety of things. Using a 
narrow sense of the word, the traditional positivist position is exemplified by the philosophies of 
the Vienna Circle oflogical positivism and the Sociologies of Auguste Comte and Emile 
Durkheim. The primary positions of these thinkers can be discussed in terms of two major issues: 
arguments regarding the status of (social) science and arguments about value-neutrality and , 
objectivity 
The first issue, that of the nature and status of science, is perhaps best represented by the 
Vienna Circle's project of 'unified science.' This refers to their belief in a universal scientific 
method common to the natural and social sciences in which "methodological procedures of 
science are unitary regardless of their domain of application"(Heritage 1984: 45). Similarly, 
Auguste Comte, who coined both the terms 'positive philosophy' and 'sociology' (Giddens 1993) 
argued that sociology should be strictly modeled after the natural sciences, so that people and 
their institutions are viewed as 'neutral objects' which could be investigated in basically the same 
way as any other scientific object (Held 1980: 155). This designation of sociology as science is 
not merely descriptive, but also evaluative, in that scientific knowledge is privileged as the only 
true knowledge (all else being simply beliefs or opinions) and is implicated in the Enlightenment 





















In situating sociology as a science, Comte and Durkheim make a number of assumptions 
about what 'science' means. One ofthe most fundamental of these is the requirement of 
objectivity and value neutrality. Under the requirements of positivism, knowledge and facts must 
be sep~ated strictly from values and beliefs (Bottomore 1984). Durkheim, for instance, argues 
for a science of society that studies social facts (which are 'things' and exterior to the individual). 
This science requires objectivity, defined in this case as: "rigorous detachment on the part of the 
investigator of social reality ... an emotionally neutral attitude toward what he sets out to 
investigate"(Giddens 1992: 89-90). In this model the position of the researcher is irrelevant, 
"objective theories are supposed to involve a 'god's eye view' which transcends any particularity 
of situation and perspective"(Barwell 1984: 81). 
Any individual biases of the researcher are supposed to be eliminated through application 
of the scientific method-- in this model the epistemological agentlknower is an individual whose 
context is irrelevant. Implied in this is a separation between the 'context of discovery' (the 
circumstances hypotheses and research questions emerge from) and the context of justification 
(the arguments for a particular theory/set of data)-- the context of discovery is epistemically 
irrelevant and the 'bias eliminating' aspects ofthe scientific method need only be directed toward 
the context of justification. 
The major tenets of this positivist epistemology can be generally divided between 
objectivism (advocating value-free, impartial, dispassionate research) and arguments about the 
status of science (specifically that the social and natural sciences are unified epistemically and 
methodologically and the equation of knowledge with science). The distinction between these 
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ofinterpretivelhermeneutic sociology (from Weber to phenomenology and ethnomethodology), 
do not share the assumptions ofDurkheim, Comte and the logical positivists assumptions about 
the nature of social science; they may, however, advocate their own forms of objectivism (and are 
thus implicated in those critiques of positivism which are centered around an anti"objectivism). 
Weber provides a good example of this. Weberian interpretive sociology disagrees with a 
Durkheimian focus on externality/social facts and instead is focused around Verstehen and 
meaning/subjectivity in human social life. Weber argued that the methods of the natural science 
were not necessarily relevant to the social sciences, which required their own methodologies due 
to their interpretive focus (Turner 1992: 214). This position understands science/social science 
very differently than the·traditional positivist position does. Weber's focus on subjectivity, 
though, does not represent a complete rejection of objectivism"" though it takes different forms 
and nuances than that of Durkheim, 'objectivity' is a central part of Weber's epistemology 
(Bannister 1987). Though his faith in the potential for science to be completely value free was 
perhaps not as strong as that ofDurkheim and Comte, Weber still argued that Verstehen and 
subjectivity must be studied objectively (Giddens 1992: 134). Phenomenological social science 
also shares Weber's rejection of scientism, but some retention of requirements of objectivity. 
Phenomenology offers strong arguments against privileging scientific discourse as the model of all 
'true knowledge' in its focus on 'folk knowledge' and its arguments for understanding science as 
a practice (Giddens 1993: 19). Yet in its project of 'bracketing' presuppositions it "aims at 
eliminating what the investigator takes for granted so that 'things themselves' appear without the 




















different assumptions and working towards different goals than conventional positivist-






















The feminist empiricists basically adhere to most major tenets of positivism and are critical 
of masculinist or androcentric research for failing to be objective enough. Millman and Kanter 
(1975) serve as Sandra Harding's (1986) primary example ofthis position. In their influential 
book Another Voice: Feminist Perspectives on Social Life and Social Science, Millman and 
Kanter demonstrate many problems and lacuna in traditional research that have distorted the 
understanding of women and gender and, consequently, all of social reality. These problems 
include a focus on the public/official at the expense of the private sphere, not taking gender into 
account as an important variable in all fields of sociology, naturalizing the status quo as 
'functional,' and using solely or predominantly male samples from which to make generalizations 
about society as a whole. Millman and Kanter, highly critical of the biases of dominant 
(masculinist) social research suggest that movements for social liberation, such as feminism, 
"make it possible for people to see the world in an enlarged perspective because they remove the 
covers and blinders that obscure knowledge"(vii). 
Cancian (1992) and Molm (1993) provide more contemporary examples of the feminist 
empiricist position. Cancian (1992) argues for stricter adherence to the facts and support for an 
arena in which beliefs/theories enter into critical debate. She argues that feminists, who offer a 
distinct epistemological/methodological position based on their perspectives on the gendered 
nature of social reality, need not give up on conventional standards of science, but rather hold all 
scientists more strictly accountable to them. Molm (1993) argues very explicitly against an 





















The procedures associated with the scientific method are designed to do exactly what 
feminist critics of positivism are most concerned about: guard against bias influencing the 
collection, analysis and interpretation of data. (310) 
Thus, the feminist empiricists work to increase objectivity through the reduction of sexist bias in 
order to more effectively produce social research. They work within most of the epistemological 
assumptions of positivist-empiricism, holding dominant theory accountable for failing to live up to 
its own standards. 
Research Methods and Feminist Empiricism 
Because the feminist empiricists make the least amount of challenges to dominant research 
epistemologies, the may be easiest to situate in terms of research methodologies and methods. 
Overall, because they work within conventional understandings of research practices, most 
feminist empiricists also work within conventional methodologies. Their challenges to the use of 
methods in conventional research focused on biased uses of methods (such as the use of male 
samples to generalize about society as a whole) and not the methods themselves. Those feminist 
researchers who do not engage explicitly with epistemological issues and take conventional 
understandings of research practices as a given would be, in most cases, appropriately identified 
as holding a feminist empiricist position. Cancian (1992), who I classify as a feminist empiricist, is 
\ 
an exception to this connection between conventional methodologies and epistemologies. 
Though she calls for working within conventional epistemology and argues for holding traditional 
social scientists accountable to their own standards, she is very critical of many conventional 
(especially quantitative) methods and is involved in the project of defining a 'feminist method.' 
Examining these researchers who do not specifically engage in any epistemological 

















sort of epistemology) demonstrates some difficulties in using Harding's (1986) tripartite model of 
feminist empiricism, standpoint theory and postmodernism. I do find her model to be a useful 
way of classifYing feminist epistemological perspectives and for clarifYing the implications of 
,understanding knowledge in various ways. Mo.st researchers, however, do not classifY themselves 
in terms of these labels. My designation of specific theorists/researchers as empiricist, standpoint 
or postmodernist may not result from their self-identification, but rather from how closely I think 
they correspond to the overall perspectives of these three categories. This is important for 
situating the (sometimes implicit) assumptions of particular theorists/researchers in terms of 
broader theoretical and epistemological traditions. 
Feminist Empiricism and Positivism 
The feminist empiricists have come under considerable attack in recent years for retaining 
too strongly the perspectives about the constitution of social reality and knowledge held by 
conventional positivist-empiricism and Enlightenment thinking. In the next section, I explain the 
crucial ways feminist postmodernists and others strongly challenge many of the assumptions about 
knowledge and objectivity shared by feminist empiricists and conventional positivists. To 
associate feminist empiricism and positivist-empiricism too closely, however, would be a mistake. 
As Sandra Harding (1986; 1990) has demonstrated, there are significant ways in which even 
feminist empiricists undermine many of the traditional tenets of positivist -empiricism. The first 
area of difference is regarding the separation between the context of discovery and the context of 
justification. Conventional Enlightenment/positivist understandings of knowledge hold that only 
the 'context of justification' is epistemically relevant; only the results of res ear chi theorizing 





















ideals of objectivity and a correspondence model of reality, argue that often we must attend to the 
context of discovery to produce the most valid and undistorted results (Harding 1986: 25). Molm 
states that "it is not the scientific method that is male biased, but the choices of research questions 
and in some cases the origin oftheories"(310). Bias cannot be looked for simply in how we 
handle and evaluate data, but also in what 'Priorities and criteria determine what questions we ask 
and what data we seek out. Millman and Kanter (1975) in their focus on the bias-reducing 
qualities offeminism and otherliberatory projects are specifically invoking the relevance of the 
social and political context of discovery for producing quality research. Though feminist 
empiricists are deeply entrenched in the values of truth and objectivity, by focusing on the context 
of discovery, they significantly transform the conventional assumptions of positivist-empiricism. 
The other major area of difference between feminist empiricism and conventional 
positivism is in the feminist empiricist challenge to the ideal ofthe unitary and disembodied 
knower. First, this can be seen in the importance ofthejeminist knower, who cannot be viewed 
as an entirely disembodied figure-- by situating the knower specifically as feminist the knower 
becomes more concrete than in the conventional positivist position. Second, is the challenge to 
the conventional positivist understanding of the agent of knowledge as an individual. Feminist 
empiricists such as Longino (1993) and Nelson (1993) argue against an epistemic focus on the 
individual knower and foCjls instead on the ways in which communities of scientists acquire and 
construct knowledge-- communities of individuals in interaction and which are epistemologically 
prior to the individuals themselves. Longino (1993), drawing on such concepts such as Kuhn's 
(1970) theory of how paradigms shape scientific knowledge, argues that the conventional bias-
reducing standards of the scientific method are all aimed at eliminating individual idiosyncratic 




















identifY biases/assumptions held by the entire community of scientists. Instead we must focus on 
how communities engage with information and interact with one another. In these and other 
perspectives, feminists empiricists, working within the positivist-empiricist framework, 
signific.iUltly transform many of the conventional assumptions of positivism . 
The Importance of Feminist Empiricism 
Though I will argue in the next section for many of the feminist postmodernist challenges 
to the assumptions of feminist empiricists, I do not want to ignore the importance of the feminist 
empiricist position in the continuing development offeminist research. The critiques feminist 
empiricists have made of dominant, traditional research with its male biases and androcentrism 
have fundamentally transformed many fields of social research. Many more researchers see 
gender as an important variable in almost any area of research than ever would have without the 
feminist empiricist critiques; as a result ofthese critiques, previous practices of concentrating 
mainly on male research subjects have come under enormous scrutiny. It is because ofthese 
feminist empiricist researchers, I believe, and their challenge to dominant research assumptions 
from within, that much feminist research and theorizing is possible-- including that of the feminist 
postmodernists. The feminist postmodernists did not become an important voice in feminist 
epistemology until the 1980's, until after the feminist empiricists secured a more stable and 
stronger position for feminists researchers within the academy. It is from this strengthened 



















Whereas feminist empiricists aim their critiques of traditional social research against 
specific instances of bias, other feminist epistemologists/researchers-- drawing from 
postmodernism, ethnomethodology, critical theory, and the sociology of knowledge-- focus 
instead on the epistemological assumptions at the very base of positivist-empiricism. They 
challenge Enlightenment and positivist theories about the possibility ( and desirability) of 
rationality, objectivity and value-neutrality as epistemological criteria in social research. They 
argue against the search for absolute foundations of knowledge and the positivist privileging of 
scientific discourse and present, instead, theories of knowledge focusing on the embodied location 
of research and'the subject-position of the researcher. This represents a move from critiquing 
examples of 'bad science' (as feminist empiricists do) to challenging ideas about the meaning and 
structure of 'science as usual' (Harding 1986). 
The feminist postmodernists4 focus not on examples of bias, but instead question the entire 
concept of 'objectivity.' They argue that no research can ever be 'value-neutral' and that this is 
not an ideal that should guide research. Rationality and objectivity, as they have been traditionally 
conceived, rely on the concept of a stable and unified self and on universal and absolute truths; 
these are ideas that have come under considerable attack by postmodern and post-structuralist 
theories. Some feminist postmodernists reject objectivity entirely (e.g. Hekman 1990), while 
others argue for its retention as an ideal-- but only after fundamentally transforming what 
objectivity means (e.g. Harding 1991; Haraway 1988). Either way, though, the postmodernist 
critique represents a crucial challenge to the assumptions that underlie most positivist-empiricist 
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and feminist empiricist research. Ideals Of absolute truth along with the formulation of 'grand 
theories' and meta-narratives are rejected in favor of partial and situated knowledges. The 
feminist postmodernists argue that the specific instances of androcentric research identified by the 
femini~t empiricists are not the result of easily correctable, idiosyncratic biases on the part of 
individual researchers, but are the results of the very structure of knowledge that guides 
contemporary research. This structure is fundamentally shaped by the Enlightenment dualisms of 
reason/emotion, object/subject, culture/nature-- all of which are connected to the dichotomy of 
male/female. The feminist postmodernists engage in debates about the status of social science, 
not only in terms of whether or not sociology can be properly considered a science, but also in 
terms of what it means for anything (from sociology to biology to physics) to be considered a 
sCIence. 
In these next sections, I argue that the feminist postmodernist project offers an extremely 
important critique of conventional positivist-empiricism and feminist empiricism. Postmodernists 
demonstrate many ways that political and social location influence and constrain all research. The 
feminist postmodernists focus particularly on the influence of gender and patriarchy; they identify 
not only biases in traditional research but also ways in which the very structure of positivist 
empiricism not only reflects but also replicates patriarchy. Their critiques offer important models 
for understanding science, knowledge, and research which can importantly influence the process 
of conducting feminist research. Their positions, though, are often associated with relativism and 
therefore rejected as an unsuitable basis for feminist social research. I agree that epistemological 
relativism would be untenable in both feminist politics and empirical sociological research. In 
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1991 and Haraway 1988) are not necessarily relativist and can be used in ways that will be helpful 
for guiding future res.earch. These theories, however, are insufficiently developed in tenns of 
what epistemological criteria are appropriate or useful in the context of justification; this is a 
significant obstacle to translating their epistemological positions into working methodologies. 
In the next section I present in greater depth these various positions associated with 
feminist postmodernists, identifying their strengths and weakness for conducting feminist social 
research. Before doing this, . however, I feel it is important to examine some of the problems with 
using this label 'feminist postmodernism.' It both connotes a more homogenous position common 
to all feminist postmodernists than actually exists (there is a great deal of variety between different 
feminist postmodernist arguments) and also inaccurately describes as postmodernist the work of 
some feminist theorists/researchers who may be drawing more from traditions such as critical 
theory, ethnomethodology and the sociology of knowledge than from specifically postmodernist 
theory. 
A number of the epistemological arguments offered by feminist postmodernists such as 
Haraway (1988; 1991), Fraser and Nicholson (1990), and Hekman (1991) overlap with arguments 
arising from critical theory, ethnomethodology and other theoretical traditions. Stanley and Wise 
(1993: 189-90) explicitly criticize feminist postmodernists for claiming postmodernism as the sole 
source of rejections of 'grand narratives,' scientism, and a representational/mirroring 
understanding of the relationship between knowledge and reality; these ideas, they argue, also 
have their roots in critical theory, language theorists such as Wittgenstein, and interactionist and 
ethnomethodological paradigms in sociology. This is an important criticism and I believe that, 




















sociology and other social sciences, the connections and similarities between postmodern theories 
and many sociological traditions are often ignored. In terms of specifically epistemological 
debates, postmodernism, however, is the arena in which most of the very important recent 
positions are being articulated-- for this reason (and for reasons of organization and simplicity) I 
will be using the term feminist postmodernist throughout most of this section. My usage of this 
term, however, connotes not only those feminists who draw on the works ofLyotard, BaudriIIard, 
Foucault, and Derrida but also incorporates the work of other theorists/researchers who, though 
drawing on different theoretical traditions, share a great deal of overlap with feminist 
postmodernists. Nor is the term 'feminist postmodernist' intended to indicate an entirely 
homogenous group. I elucidate some of the differences among feminist postmodernists in the 
next sections. 
Science, Feminism and Postmodernism 
Feminist postmodernist analyses of science introduce important questions of authority into 
traditional understandings of science. In doing so, they greatly improve both on the arguments of 
c 
the feminist empiricists (who do no sufficiently address questions of the authority and power of 
the scientist/researcher and what this means for understanding social research) and the arguments 
of non-feminist postmodernists (who do frame their discussions of power and knowledge in terms 
of gender). Sartori (1994) and Yeatman (1994) argue that postmodernism and feminism produce 
a dramatic crisis in the modernist authority of science. Sartori (1994) explains that, whereas 
tradition and religion were dominant domains of authority in pre-modern societies and 
epistemologies, science becomes the ultimate authority and guardian of truth under 





















discoverers/creators of this knowledge, are considered to have unique access to the truth and thus 
are in positions of great authority. This authority, Yeatman (1994) argues, though enveloped in 
the guise of neutrality and universalism, actually rests on a profound distinction between the 
knower/scientists and the objects of study-- objects which, in social research, are often people; 
these objects have particularly included those who Enlightenment philosophy "had cast as Other: 
natives, colonials, women and all who are placed in a client relationship to expert, professional 
authority"(187). Thus the modernist authority of scientists is specifically made possible through 
the objectification and designation as passive of those deemed as 'Other.' 
Drawing on Habermas' critique of scientism and on postmodernism's challenge to 
universal and transcendent values, feminist theorists demonstrate crucial ways in which the 
structure that privileges scientific discourse inherently silences those who are not included within 
positivist values of rationality, abstraction, and scientific detachment. These values rest on key 
modernist dualisms of rationa1!lITational, culture/nature, subject/object and knowerlknoWll. These 
dualisms, Cixous and other post-structuralists have argued, are always oppositional and 
hierarchical (with the first term valued over the second) and are fundamentally connected to the 
dualism of male/female (Hekman 1990:45). Thus, devaluation of women is implicated in the very 
roots of concepts of rationality, subjectivity and knowledge. These dualisms, Smith (1987a; 
1987b) argues, are crucial to the implicit understandings of knowledge underlying traditional 
sociological research. 
Hekman (1990) argues against feminist empiricists and liberal feminists who simply seek 
to integrate/add women into positivist-empiricist conceptualizations of science, reason and 
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standpoint theorists who seek to overturn the dualisms, thus privileging emotion over reason, 
women's subjectivity over masculinist 'objectivity.' Feminist postmodern and deconstructive 
epistemologies demonstrate that neither of these are sufficient, that "anything short of outright 
rejection of the dualisms and rationalism ofEnlighternnent thought will not be a successful 
strategy"(Hekrnan 1990: 8), This is because, she argues, only ifwe displace and deconstruct 
these dualisms and traditional conceptualizations of rationality, science, knowledge, and research 
will the gender domination inherent in these concepts be obviated; on the other hand, "an alliance 
with modernism, , , can only result in a perpetuation of the Enlighternnentlmodernist 
epistemology that inevitably places women in an inferior position"(2). 
Feminist postmodernists such as Hekrnan provide interesting philosophical and 
epistemological critiques of positivistlEnlighternnent assumptions about science, rationality and 
knowledge and the connections these assumptions have to gender relations. It is not terribly 
clear, however, how these theories could and should impact actual sociological research 
processes, Her theories do have importance for understanding sociology in terms of 'science'; 
she challenges not only positivist arguments that sociology is a science that shares the same 
methodological and epistemological directives as the natural sciences (e,g. Durkheim) but also 
interpretiveihumanist theories that see sociology as distinctly different than the natural sciences 
due to sociology's interpretive/subjective nature (e.g. Weber). Hekrnan sets up this debate in 
terms of positivists vs. humanists and argues that though the two groups differ in how they see 
sociology relating to natural science they share cornmon assumptions about natural science--
assumptions that postmodern theories severely challenge. Both sides, she argues, define the 
natural sciences as representing the paradigm of true knowledge. "Although humanists argued for 
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a 'separate but equal' status for social sciences, their position was always constituted as a defense 
of social science knowledge vis-a-vis that of natural science, Thus, the priority of the natural 
science paradigm was not seriously questioned"(4), Using the theories of Gadamer, she argues 
that both natural and social sciences are fundamentally hermeneutic and all understanding is 
contextual and rooted in tradition; instead ,of conceding that the human sciences are subjective 
(and therefore irrational) she rejects the rationaVirrational dualism itself Therefore, by 
challenging what is meant by science and natural science she is challenging how sociology is to be 
understood; in doing so she is refuting both 'poles' of the debate of positivists vs, humanists, 
showing that they share a problematic Enlightenment legacy. 
Still, Hekman's arguments (and I believe this holds true for many other primarily 
philosophical feminist postmodernist work, e.g. Flax 1990; Benhabib 1990; Bordo 1990) are not 
specific in terms of doing social research, even if these issues are implicit throughout her work. 
How are we to use these ideas in terms of structuring research questions, defending research 
analyses and collecting or interpreting data? These questions are not entirely answerable from the 
arguments Hekman provides. I must tum to feminist postmodernists who more clearly prioritize 
questions about research and methodology to begin to answer these questions, which have been 
addressed in greatest depth around the issue of' objectivity. ' 
Feminism, Postmodernism and Objectivity in Social Research 
While postmodem feminist critiques such as Hekman's (1990) offer important analyses of 
rationality, objectivity, science, and knowledge on a very abstract level, such analyses can only 
have importance for the practice of empirical research when more directly connected to actual 





















research offer an important beginning to this project. Like the feminist empiricists, postmodern 
feminists critique the ways in which conventional, supposedly value-neutral, social research has 
actually been embedded in dominant ideologies of racism, colonialism and patriarchy (Sprague 
and Zimmerman 1992). Code (1991) argues that crucial to the claims of objectivity and value-
neutrality in traditional research are the hidden subjectivities of dominant groups. Keller (1990) 
and Braidotti (1994) similarly argue that the 'neutral' and 'objective' stance of positivist research 
has historically been considered available only to those individuals who are socially considered 
'norm-a1' so that women (and all those constituted as 'Other') are disqualified from a capacity to 
achieve neutrality. Unlike the feminist empiricists, however, who organize their critique of 
sexistlandrocentric bias around the articulation of or search for an un-biased, objective position 
from which to conduct research, the feminist postmodernists argue that no research can ever be 
entirely detached or neutral, that all research is shaped by the location of the researcher. 
The objectivity and value-neutrality endorsed by positivist-empiricists (and to a lesser 
degree the feminist empiricists) requires the possibility of an Archimedean, 'God's eye view' from 
which to conduct properly objective research (what Haraway (1988) refers to as the 'God Trick,' 
requiring both a view from nowhere and a view from everywhere); such a position, however, is 
never truly attainable. As Lather (1991), Stanley and Wise (1991; 1993), Bordo (1990), and 
others argue, all research is value-laden and is empowered or constrained by the material location 
(socially, politically, philosophically, historically) of those who conduct research. 
These theories are drawing from a number of different traditions in the philosophy and 
sociology of science. One fundamental influence has been Kuhn's (1970) The Structure of 





















,science'is a socio-historical process of paradigm transitions in which "observations are theory-
laden, theories are paradigm-laden and paradigms are culture-laden"(Harding 1986:107); they 
conclude that there are no such things as value-neutral, objective facts, Kuhn's work, however, is 
an internalist account of science and is marked by an absence of discussion on the impact of 
(social, political, and historical) events external to scientific enterprise (Nielsen 1990: 22), As a 
result, feminists have also turned to other more externalist accounts from the sociology of 
knowledge and postmodern theorists, Bloor's (1991) "Strong Programme" of the sociology of 
scientific knowledge expands on the Kuhnian model by explaining crucial ways that social and 
historical processes shape all scientific research and theories (both 'true' and 'false' theories 
alike} Bloor's discussion, however, curiously makes no mention of gender as a significant 
variable in this; feminist epistemologists greatly expand Bloor's programme through their analysis 
of gender relations and patriarchy, Foucault's (1972) theories about the connections between 
knowledge and power and the ways in which discourse structures individuals have been 
particularly influential on the work of postmodern feminist epistemologists, Also important is 
Rorty, who argues that all ideas are the creations of social beings rather than 'representations' or 
'mirrorings' of nature (Bordo 1990: 136} Again, however, feminist epistemologists have 
significantly transformed these theories by demonstrating the specifically gendered aspects of 
these processes and by analyzing these theories in terms of their importance for performing 
feminist social research, 
Drawing on these and other theories, the feminist postmodernists argue that all research 
(even 'good research,' even feminist research) must be understood as situated and partial, that no 
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from the perspectives ofhis or her position in the social hierarchy and in history"(Harding 1991: 
39). The importance of social location is most easily seen in the context of discovery in which 
research questions and areas of interest are influenced by what researchers see as 'important' 
(which is shaped in part by social/political location and the history of academic disciplines and 
fields). As Bordo (1990) argues: 
No matter how local and circumscribed the object or how attentive the scholar to the axes 
that constitute social identity and structure, some of these axes will be chosen and other 
ignored or silenced (140). 
Also socially constructed and influenced is the context of justification, in how we analyze 'facts' 
and indeed how we determine what can count as facts. This is because facts are always infused 
with values, both facts and values are open to critical debate and "evidence is selected not 
found"(Code 1991: 30). 
Some feminists who critique the positivist project and who see value neutrality as 
impossible still retain it as an ideal. For example, Jayarante and Stewart (1991) argue that 
"although absolute objectivity is not possible ... the pursuit of some type of objectivity5 as a goal 
does have the potential to protect against several forms ofbiases"(98). Even though we may not 
be completely successful, simply by striving for objectivity we may cut down on some biases. 
Other feminists, however, have provide extremely compelling arguments that value neutrality is 
not even necessarily desirable (Sprague and Zimmerman 1992). These arguments take two major 
forms. The first is regarding the importance that (explicitly non value-neutral) politics can have 
for shaping good research and the second is regarding the implications of the split between subject 
5 Many feminists who retain objectivity as an ideal, though, significantly transform what objectivity means 
equating it not with value-neutrality, but rather some degree ofrealismJanti-relativism. The significance oftbis 






















. and object implicit in traditional conceptualizations of objectivity. It is to the first strain of this 
argument that I now turn. 
Feminist Politics and Social Research 
,. Some feminists argue against the desirability of a value neutral position for the researcher 
with the explanation that specifically feminist and other emancipatory values actl)a1ly improve 
research due to the perspective on dominant ideologies that they open up (Harding 1986;1991 
Lather 1991; Mies 1991). Thus, it is specifically from our positions as feminists (rather than an 
attempt at a 'view from nowhere') from which some of the most important insights offeminist 
research arise-- our biasesiemancipatory values may make us more attentive to the multiple and 
conflicting layers of 'reality,' rather than limiting our understanding of it. Lather (1991) notes 
that the focus on the political nature of all social research has necessitated a move from the 
question 'is this research biased?' to 'whose interests does this bias serve?,(14). Ifwe 
acknowledge that all research is in some ways politically and socially invested, then it may make 
sense that some values or politics may produce better research than others: 
Isn't it reasonable to suppose that claims originating in racist and sexist projects may well 
be less worthy of scientific attention and less likely to "reveal" reality-- than those 
originating in anti-racist, anti-sexist projects? (Harding 1986: 107). 
Feminist theorists have argued for this position in numerous ways. Mies (1991) uses the 
explanation that in order to understand a thing one has to change it (65), Lather (1991) 
comments that' emancipatory knowledge' increases an understanding of perspectives on social 
organization that are hidden by dominant ideologies in conventional research (52). Finally, 





















.~. the dominant perspective, researchers must consciously orient themselves towards the interests 
and struggles of dominated groups (260). 
These positions all represent arguments not only about the possibility, but also about the 
desirability of the value-neutral and. detached researcher of positivist epistemology. The explicit 
political stance of feminist research is the focus of many criticisms; positivists argue that the 
influence of politics upon research produces biased and unscientific results. Martyn Hammersly 
(1992; 1994) provides a useful example of the positivist critiques offeminist research. He rejects 
the position that research is benefited by explicitly orienting it towards (feminist) politics, arguing 
that "the point of research is to produce knowledge, not to transform the world or to adhere to 
any other practical result. This is what distinguishes research from political activity in the narrow 
sense"(1994: 293). Implicit in this position is the assumption that research that is not explicitly 
political is apolitical and that, by not acknowledging one's politics or social position, one's 
research is not influenced by social and political location. The feminist postmodernist critique, 
however, demonstrates that not concerning one's self with the political implications of one's work 
is itselfa political position. Code (1992) proposes that "we abandon the search for and deny the 
possibility of the disinterested and dislocated view from nowhere and assert the political 
investedness of most knowledge producing activity"(20). By demonstrating the political and 
social investedness of all research, postmodern feminists severely disable the type of criticism that 
Hammersly presents. They show that the difference between explicitly feminist research and 
'neutral' research is not that feminist research is political and therefore biased, but that feminists 




















Subject aud Object in Social Research 
Another reason many feminists cite not only the impossibility but also the undesirability of 
conventional objectivity is the conceptual split between knowing subject and known object 
embedded in the concept of objectivity" Smith (1987) argues that the positivist ideal of 
objectivity that guides much of sociological research is designed to separate the knower from the 
object of study. She explains that the illusion of this separation can only be maintained if the 
knower is posited as an abstract being and the object is posited as the' other' who can never 
reflect back on or influence the knower. The assumptions about the knower/subject and 
known/object are seriously undermined through many feminist critiques. As discussed earlier, 
many feminists (e.g. Code 1992; MacKinnon 1983; Smith 1987) show that the ideal of the 
abstract, disembodied knower hides the actual historically and socially situated subjectivities of 
the knower. Feminists also challenge the objectification of the known/object of research. Stanley 
(1990) argues: "for feminists the known is also the knower, research objects are their own 
subjects"(11). MacKinnon (1983) argues that "having been objectified as sexual beings while 
being slighted as ruled by subjective passions, women reject the distinction between knowing 
subject and known object, the distinctions between subjective and objective positions"(248). 
Looking at the power differentials between researchers and those researched is an 
important project and must inform our understanding of the concept of 'objectivity.' Granting 
agency to the researcher/subject at the expense ofthe researched/object, in which only the 
researcher is granted a critical voice, is detrimental to the research process as a whole and is 





















antithetical to most feminist politics. I strongly agree with Smith (1987) and Harding (1991) who 
argue for the necessity of the researcher to place herself in the same critical plane as those she 
studies. This project is the subject of many of the debates surrounding feminist methodology. I 
explor~ the ways. many feminists attempt to apply this directive in actual empirical research in the 
methodology sections of this paper. 
Postmodem feminists, though, demonstrate that feminists must be wary of simply 
reversing (rather than deconstructing) the subject/object dichotomy or of uncritically celebrating 
women's subjectivity (which often becomes equated with women's experience). MacKinnon 
(1983), who denies the desirability of objectivity, equating it with male subjectivity, argues that 
"feminism's claim to women's perspective is its claim to the truth ... feminists do not see 
women's perspective as partial"(252). Such a move is problematic because it assumes that 
women, through their experiences, have an unmediated relationship with 'reality' -- a perspective 
that postmodem deconstructions of representation and experience have made suspect (Fraser and 
Nicholson 1990; Lazreg 1994). Acker, Barry and Esseweld (1991) present an important 
challenge to the assumptions made by MacKinnon and others who focus on women's 
subjectivities. They argue that it is important to transform the researcher/researched relationship 
and that the objectifying tendencies of objectivity need to be minimized. They note, however, that 
this project can never be entirely complete or free from tension. For the experiences of individual 
women to inform our understanding of social structure, "the researcher must [to some degree] 
objectify the experience of the researched, must translate that experience into more abstract and 


















produce analysis that goes beyond the experience of the researched while still granting them full 
subjectivity"(Acker et all991: 147). 
MacKinnon's perspective also treats "women's subjectivities" as a unified, stable and 
hom0i5.enous category. This assumes the presence of a unified subject within each individual, 
thereby failing to address the postmodem deconstruction of the subject (Gibson 1994). It also 
ignores the enormous differences among women (on lines of race, class, or sexuality, for 
instance). As Cannon, Higginbotham, and Lewy (1991) argue, what many feminists have 
described as women's subjectivity or women's experience is actually white, middle class women's 
subjectivity. This problem is intensified in the case offeminist standpoint epistemologies which 
are organized around doing research from the perspective of women's lives, experiences, and 
subjectivities; I further the difficulties with the concept of experience (and specially 'women's 
experience') in the section on standpoint theory. 
Feminism, Postmodernism and Relativism 
To some, the feminist postmodernist arguments about the partiality of all perspective and 
the value-Iadenness of all knowledge and research seem very dangerous to feminism. Walby 
(1992) associates this move with "abdicating the goal of accurate and systematic knowledge" , . 
arguing that "rather than abandoning the modernist project of explaining the world, we should be 
developing concepts and theories to explain gender, ethnicity and c1ass"(48). To Walby, the 
argument that grand narratives or complete and final knowledge projects are not possible is the 
same as completely abandoning any search for knowledge. Similarly, DiStefano (1990) claims 
that "the postmodernist project, if seriously adopted by feminists, would make any semblance of a 





















and the concept of truth, feminist postmodernists lose any basis from which they can judge 
competing claims; without this basis there can be no feminist knowledge projects or feminist 
politics because feminists would not be able to critique patriarchy and androcentrism. I agree that 
epistemological relativism (that there are no grounds upon which to judge competing knowledge 
claims) seems incongruous with programs of social research and feminist politics; this would be 
tantamount to conceding that patriarchal ideology is as valid/invalid as feminist critiques of it, 
which would be enormously disabling for any sort of feminist political action. I argue, though, 
drawing particularly on the works of Harding (1986; 1991) and Haraway (1988), that an extreme 
critique of value-neutra1ity and the assertion that there is no unitary or final truth, does not 
necessarily result in an epistemological relativism. Instead, their reformulations of the concept of 
objectivity offer important alternatives to the dichotomy of absolute truth/value neutrality vs. 
nihilistic relativism that are too often presented as the only alternatives for a feminist 
epistemology. 
Harding (1986) examines the question: "does our recognition of the fact that science has 
always been a social product-- that its projects and claims to knowledge bear the fingerprints of 
its human producers-- require the exaltation of a relativistic subjectivity on the part of 
feminism?"(137) and answers a definite "No." Though no disinterested, impartial and value-free 
knowledge is possible and "each person can only achieve a partial view of reality," she argues that 
"nevertheless it is possible to make reasonable judgments that some beliefs are better supported 
by empirical evidence than others"(1991: 99). Harding is actually not rejecting the concept of 
objectivity entirely, but instead radically transforms what the concept means. Positivists and 
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knowledge is actually knowledge (all else being 'beliefs'). Harding refers to these projects as 
'objectivism' or weak objectivity. Weak objectivity, by discussing itself as value-neutral, allows 
dominant groups to disregard their own historical commitments. Harding instead advocates what 
she calls 'strong objectivity'; this separates the concept of objectivity from the modemist ideal of 
value-neutrality and does not abandon empirical research entirely even though she acknowledges 
the incompleteness of all knowledge projects. What Harding (and others, such as Barwell1994) 
rejects is not objectivity but value-neutrality, not knowledge but grand theory and the belief in 
absolute knowledge, In arguing this she is not only critiquing positivist -empiricists, but also those 
postmodernists ~ho completely reject' objectivity' as an ideal and along with it any sort of 
systematic knowledge projects and who advocate epistemological relativism She argues that 
"postmodern relativists agree with positivist modernists in the assumption that one truth vs. none 
is the only system"(1991: 99} Relativists have too limited a view of Slbjectivity because they do 
not separate it from value neutrality and do not allow for partial knowledges. Harding accuses 
these postmodern feminists of actually being too modernist because they assume that the only 
objectivity and science possible is that which is tied up with modern, Western and androcentric 
values. 
Haraway (1988) addresses these questions of objectivity and relativism in a similar 
fashion. She sees most feminist thought as being trapped between the two poles of totalization 
and relativism. Under the constraints of this dichotomy, she demonstrates, it seems natural to 
assume that if one is rejecting absolute truth and the' god trick' of "being nowhere yet claiming to 
be everywhere"(584) the only alternative is relativism Haraway, however, argues that neither 
pole of this dichotomy is viable for feminism. She explains that relativism is the "perfect mirror of 





















both make it impossible to see well"(584). Relativism is only the 'natural alternative' to 
totalization and 'value-free' research if you accept the positivists' claims that truth must be 
conceptualized as unitary, that knowledge must be aperspectival. Instead, she argues that we 
must reject this either/or dichotomy of total truth vs. no truth along with the assumption that 
knowledge requires the 'god trick'(585). She argues for the need to go beyond identifying bias 
and holding out for some form of feminist empiricism, "to have an account of radical, historical 
contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects," but also simultaneously to have "a 
no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a 'real worJd"'(580). She does not reject the 
concept of objectivity, but she does completely transform its meaning arguing that "feminist 
objectivity is about limited location and situated knowledge, not about transcendence and splitting 
of subject and object"(583). But, to hold at bay those who still interpret this as leading to 
relativism, she makes it explicit that "not just any partial perspective will do; we must be hostile to 
easy relativism and holisms"(585). Feminist objectivity, she argues, is about "situated knowledges 
... objectivity turns out to be about particular and specific embodiment and definitely not about 
the false vision promising transcendence of all limits and responsibility ... only partial perspective 
promises objective vision"(583). This concept of situated knowledges importantly and 
fundamentally transforms conventional positivist-empiricist understandings knowledge without 
falling prey to the dangers of relativism. 
Feminist Postmodernisms: Going a Step Further 
I find both Harding (1986; 1991) and Haraway's (1988) perspectives on the issues of 
objectivity, value neutrality and relativism to be extremely important starting points for feminists 
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simply whether or not it is productive to retain the word 'objectivity' (with all of the baggage it 
carries) if we are going to fundamentally transfonn our understanding of this, or if it would be 
more useful to devise a new vocabulary (Tancred 1994). Another question I have is regarding the 
application of these ideas. Both Harding and Haraway ground themselves more specifically in 
epistemology than methodology; it is crucial to work out the methodological implications of these 
theories. The fact that the methodological implications of these positions on objectivity have not 
been nearly as well developed may help to explain why these postmodernist approaches seem 
much more dominant in the fields of philosophy, literary theory, and epistemology and much more 
marginalized in relation to applied social research. Do Harding and Haraway's positions imply 
any specific method or methodology? Can all traditional research methods be used with these 
epistemologies or are only some appropriate? Is there a feminist method? These questions and 
others need to be more fully addressed before postmodern feminist positions are able to move 
from intriguing epistemologies to useful methodologies. 
Another important question left unanswered is that of epistemic justification (Longino 
1992). It is clear that both Harding and Haraway are arguing that there are grounds upon which 
we can discriminate among competing knowledge claims (even if no claims can represent the 
absolute final truth), but upon what basis can we do this? One possible answer, that utilized by 
Stanley and Wise (1991) for instance, is to base epistemic justification on women's perspective 
and experience. Though they see integrating women's subjective accounts of their experience 
into research as vital, both Harding and Haraway resist any move that valorizes women's 
subjectivity and that creates a new experiential foundationalism. Ifwomen's experiences and 
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recourse to 'the (partial perspective of) evidence,' but it is unclear on what basis researchers can 
discriminate between different' evidences.' Are they accepting the positivist-empiricist account for 
this part of the research process (the context of justification) or are they presenting something 
unique and new? It is clear that a theory of power needs to be integrated into our evaluations of 
competing knowledge claims, but what specific form is this to take? The context of discovery may 
be so much more emphasized than the context of justification simply in reaction to conventional 
epistemology in which only the context of justification is viewed as open to intelligible debate. 
Regardless, I think Harding and Haraway's arguments will be much stronger if they more 
explicitly and in greater detail answer questions of epistemic justification. 
Feminist empiricists and feminist postmodernists present important challenges to dominant 
practices and assumptions about the social research process. Feminist empiricists demonstrate 
many problems with androcentric research and paved the way for other positions in feminist 
epistemology, but are too accepting of the structures and assumptions that underlie positivist-
empiricism. Feminist postmodernists demonstrate that all knowledge is marked by the social 
location of its producer and that all knowledge is partial. Partiality is not necessarily detrimental, 
but instead may be a resource for feminists; value-neutrality should not always be an ideal. 
However, this position does not necessarily lead to relativism; this is only the case if we accept the 
positivist's claims that objectivity requires value neutrality and only 'absolute' knowledge projects 
produce real knowledge. Though these epistemological projects have yet to be completely 
worked out in terms of applied method and methodologies, the epistemological projects outlined 
by Sandra Harding and Donna Haraway provide important beginnings for reformulating our 
understanding of objectivity and the position it should have in feminist social research. 
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Within the various fonns of feminist standpoint theory there are conflicting positions on 
objectivity and relativism; sOIlle theories share affinities with feminist empiricism and others are 
distinctly postmodernist. Examining the standpoint theorists in tenns of both epistemological and 
methodological implications thus sheds light not only on these particular theorists, but much of 





















Feminist Standpoint Theory 
Feminist standpomt theorists draw on arguments about how male subjectivities and 
standpomts have been disguised as unbiased/value-neutral m conventional social research and 
arguments about the socially situated and embodied nature of all research. They argue that people 
who occupy different structural positions m society see social life and social organization in 
different ways, from different standpoints. The questions traditionally asked in sociology have 
been based on seemg society from a masculinist standpoint. To correct this tendency, they 
advocate social research organized around feminist standpoints. In order to explore the 
epistemological implications of such a position I will briefly outline the arguments of some of the 
key figures m standpomt theory: Hartsock (1987), Smith (1987), Collins (1990a; 1990b) and 
Harding (1993). 
Marxist arguments about the ways in which position m the division oflabor structures the 
experiences and perspectives of individuals provide a major source of thought for feminist 
, 
standpomt epistemologies. Hartsock (1987) argues that women's position in the sexual division 
oflabor means that women's lives differ dramatically from those of men and that this has 
significant epistemological consequences. Hartsock explains that Marx and Luckacs argue for the 
importance of the standpomt of the proletariat who, because they do not have the mvestment in 
the perpetuation of the status quo that the bourgeoisie do, are able to see and understand aspects 
of reality hidden in domillant ideology. She transfers these 'arguments to the sexual division of 
labor, arguing that the material/structural position of women provide them with a 





















labor that men, who ben,efit from existing gender relations, cannot (158), She argues that it is 
through the struggle against exploitative systems, thereby positing the need for a specifically 
feminist standpoint, not just a woman's standpoint, , 
Smith (1987) argues for a sociology not only about, but for, women which eschews the 
abstraction and disembodiment of conventional sociology and takes the everyday lives of women 
as its problematic. Conventional sociology, she argues, is organized around principles of 
anonymity, impartiality, detachment and impersonality and has objectified women's experiences. 
Such positions, according to Smith, must be seen as social practices possible only through a 
sexual division oflabor in which men are accorded the privilege of detachment from everyday 
concerns only through placing the responsibility of focusing on daily lives and experiences on the 
shoulders of women. Smith argues that sociological priorities need to reorganized so that 
concrete experiences and the perspectives of women take on a new importance through a 
sociology from the standpoint of women. Feminists sociologists experience a "bifurcated 
consciousness" which is the result of the contradiction and points of rupture that emerge from 
their involvement with the abstractions and detachment emphasized in their training as 
sociologists and their daily experiences as women. These points of rupture generate important 
insights about the nature of sociology and social relations (particularly gender relations) that will 
be of fundamental importance in the creation of a sociology for women. 
Patricia Hill Collins (1990a; 1990b) draws on these ideas about bifurcated consciousness, 
writing specifically about the standpoint of Black feminists. Black female sociologists, 
marginalized not only by those who are most privileged in society but also by Black men and 




















training and a).lthority as sociologists, but outsiders through their marginalization). She 
comments: "As outsiders/within, Black feminists may be one of many distinct groups of marginal 
intellectuals whose standpoints promise to enrich contemporary sociological discourse ... they 
may reveal aspects of social reality obscured by more orthodox approaches"(1990a: 36). She 
draws on Kuhn's (1970) arguments about the nature of paradigms for organizing knowledge in 
which those fully embedded in a paradigm cannot see its internal contradictions; because of this, 
she argues that Black feminists, as outsiders, may be more likely to see anomalies within dominant 
discourse and thus may not be as accepting of the assumptions and practices of ' normal science' 
(1990a: 53). An Afrocentric feminist epistemology, she argues, challenges many positivist ideals 
by stressing the importance of concrete experiences (including the experiences of the researcher), 
of emotional connectedness between the knower and known, and of an ethic of accountability 
towards one's research subjects (1990b: 201-219). 
Finally, Sandra Harding (1993) argues for a standpoint epistemology that starts from the 
perspectives of marginalized lives, takes the everyday as its problematic, and situates the knower 
and the known in the same critical plane. In stratified societies, she argues, the activities of those 
at the top limit what persons who perform these activities can understand about the world, 
whereas the standpoints of those marginalized by social hierarchies may provide starting points 
(though still partial) that open up hew and less distorted ways of understanding the world (54). 
Standpoint Theory and Methodology 
The feminist standpoint theorists, unlike most of the feminist postmodernists, orient 
themselves very specifically in terms of actually performing research. Because of this they make 





















methodologies/research methods. They advocate a sociology organized around understanding 
society from the standpoint of women and other marginalized persons. In most cases 7 this 
translates' into a feclls on methodologies that allow for dialogue and exchange between the 
researcher and the researched and which can present the women's own voices. Highly interactive 
qualitative interviews and participant observation are seen as especially helpful for this project. 
Unlike quantitative surveys, in which respondents are constrained by the categories and questions 
of the researcher and unlike lab experiments which are detached from the everyday lives of 
women, qualitative methods, they argue, allow for the researched to organize their responses from 
the priorities of their daily lives. For these reasons, those advocating a specific feminist 
method/methodology are almost always working from an (implicit or explicit) feminist standpoint 
epistemology. In the second (methodological) half of the paper, I examine the implications of this 
methodological stance. 
Critiques of Standpoint Theory 
Feminist standpoint theory has been the subject of considerable criticism, particularly from 
feminist postmodernists. Various theorists have accused it of essentialism, of ignoring the 
differences within the category 'women,' of working from an uncritical understanding of 
'experience,' and offoundationalism or, conversely, relativism. In this section I examine the 
criticisms of Longino, Lazreg, Haraway and Bar On, and argue that the problems they find 
represent serious traps that much of standpoint theory falls into. For feminist standpoint theory to 
have any utility in guiding feminist social research it must account for various and competing 
7 Harding (1993) differs significantly from most other feminist standpoint theorists. She does not necessarily share 
in the same methodological assumptions. I examine her methodological argmnents in the conclusion to this 





















women's standpoints and cannot use standpoints as criteria for epistemic justification. Feminist 
standpoint theories that are combined with feminist postmodernism, however, (particularly that of 
Sandra Harding (1993)) can provide a useful epistemology for some feminist research. 
Bar On (1993), a critic of the standpoint position, defines standpoint epistemology as the 
idea that "not only is all knowledge perspectival, but also that some perspectives are more 
revealing than others" and "the attribution of epistemic privilege to socially marginalized 
subjects"(85). The attribution of epistemic privilege from the criteria of marginality encounters a 
number of problems when we acknowledge the existence of multiple socially marginalized groups 
(e.g. African American middle class women, working class white men, Latina lesbians). She asks: 
"Is anyone of these groups more epistemically privileged than the others and if that is not so-- if 
they are all equally epistemically privileged-- does epistemic privilege matter?"(89). To answer 
these questions standpoint theorists have generally either assessed various positions in terms of 
distance from the center or looked at the cumulative effect of multiple oppressions. Both of these 
practices are problematic, Bar On argues, because they are operate under the assumption of a 
single center that society is organized around. This ignores the numerous developments in 
contemporary feminist theory that document the multiple and conflicting logics of racism, 
homophobia, capitalism, and patriarchy. Equally problematic to Bar On is the fact that they are 
grounding epistemic privilege in the identity and practices of marginalized people. Though she 
acknowledges that granting the marginalized an epistemic privilege may have seemed politically 
advantageous, Bar On posits that we must give up the idea of epistemic privilege: "by claiming an 





















socially marginalize it, 1;>y excluding its base, silencing it, and commanding its obedience to the 
voice of the dominant group"(97). 
Lazreg (1994), reacting against the use of experience in feminist standpoint theory, argues 
that focusing too much on the individual, subjective level ignores structural constraints on 
experience. She argues that, in privileging women's experiences, feminist standpoint theorists 
seem to assume that women have an unmediated relationship with reality and therefore can find 
'the truth.' Though they may be arguing against the rationalist foundationalism of much 
Enlightenment thought, the feminist standpoint theorists still retain problematic aspects of 
modernism in their recourse to 'the truth' (albeit on a different basis than positivism). In doing 
this, Lazreg argues, the feminist standpoint theorists may be guilty of attempting to create a new 
'experiential' foundationalism, which will ultimately be as destructive for feminist politics and 
empirical research as Enlightenment's traditional search for absolute foundations of knowledge. 
Haraway (1988) argues against standpoint theories, charging them with not 
acknowledging the heterogeneity among women and not being sufficiently critical of the limitation 
of all standpoints (including feminist standpoints). Standpoint theory, she argues, is in "serious 
danger of romanticizing and/or appropriating the vision of the less powerful while claiming to see 
from their position"(584). She argues that no standpoints are 'innocent' or exempt from critical 
analysis or deconstruction. Instead of basing feminist research around the assumed commonalities 
among all women or trying to construct a new truth based around women's experiences and 
standpoints, feminist research can only be successful when based around differences between 



















Fin<lily, Longino (1993), echoing Bar On (1993), defines feminist standpoint epistemology 
as the position that "the powerless are those with epistemic legitimacy"(106). Longino agrees 
with many of the tenets of feminist standpoint theorists, such as their arguments against the 
possibility of value free knowledge. The problems she encounters come from the issue of multiple 
oppressions. Standpoint epistemologies, in their concern with epistemic privilege due to 
marginalized standpoint, seem unable to deal with multiple fOnTIS and sites of oppression faced by 
different groups. 'What group is the most oppressed? What group is the most epistemically 
legitimate?,' she asks. Feminist standpoint theorists cannot legitimize one standpoint above all 
others, but: 
if no single standpoint is privileged then either the standpoint theorist must embrace 
multiple and incompatible knowledge positions or offer some means of transforming 
or integrating multiple perspectives into one. Both ofthese moves require either the 
abandonment or supplementation of standpoint as an epistemic criterion. (107) 
The arguments of Bar On (1993), Longino (1993a), Haraway (1988) and Lazreg (1994) 
demonstrate serious flaws in many fOnTIS of feminist standpoint theory. Smith (1987) constantly 
writes of "the standpoint of women" as an unproblematic concept stressing the commonalities 
among all women, often at the expense of any recognition of differences. Kasper (1994) who 
attempts to 'apply' Smith's epistemological stances in research uses standpoint theory to focus on 
women's experiences and grant them full subjectivity. To Kasper, this means to "respect each 
women's ability to interpret the experiences of her life far better than I could,"(277) arguing 
against "imposing" her values upon their experiences. This certainly seems to be a fOnTI of 
'experiential foundationalism' and is guilty of exactly what Haraway (1988) charges of standpoint 
theory-- romanticizing women's standpoints and treating them as innocentlundistorted. Finally, 





















standpoint. That women themselves inhabit very different social structural positions from one 
another and that women have varying degrees of privilege/power does not seem to inform her 
theories at all. She provides absolutely no way of judging between competing perspectives arising 
out of different women's standpoints. 
-Collins (1990a; 1990b) and Harding (1993), however, do not fit the critiques of feminist 
standpoint theories quite so neatly. Integral to Collins' standpoint theory is an understanding of 
the interlocking nature of various social hierarchies and she is certainly not guilty of homogenizing 
women's experiences into one 'woman's standpoint' (though she may in some instances 
homogenize African American women's experiences). Neither, however, is she arguing for the 
sole epistemic privilege of Black feminists. She notes that "one implication of standpoint 
approaches can be that the more subordinated the group, the purer the vision of the oppressed 
group," but argues against this tendency stating that "although it is tempting to claim that Black 
women are more oppressed than everyone else and therefore have the best standpoint from which 
'. 
( 
to understand the mechanisms, processes and effects of oppression, this simply is -not the 
I 
case"(1990b: 207). Collins is not, however, able to completely respond to the questions raised by 
critics of standpoint theory who wonder how standpoint theorists plan to argue for or against 
competing knowledge claims arising from different standpoints. This is because she, like Smith 
and Hartsock, focuses on the privilege of standpoint in the context of justification. It is in 
challenging this aspect offeminist standpoint theory that Sandra Harding (1993) makes a 
significant contribution to this theoretical tradition. 
Harding (1993) specifically addresses the issue. of difference in her arguments for her 





















~pistemology that she presents differs sufficiently from the types criticized in the above 
paragraphs so that she successfully avoids the paralysis and contradictions that other standpoint 
epistemologies may face when dealing with a heterogeneous group of women and groups of 
marginalized people that are not female. To understand why this is, it is important to look at how 
she defines standpoint epistemology. She argues that "All knowledge attempts are socially 
situated and that some of these objective social locations [those of traditionally marginalized 
people] are better than others for startingpointsjor knowledge projects"(56, emphasis mine). 
Though this very closely resembles the definition used by Bar On and Longino ( quoted above), it 
contains differences that free Harding's project from the problems identified by critics of 
standpoint epistemology. Harding does not grant the standpoint of marginalized people epistemic 
privilege or legitimacy in the context of justification, as the analyses of Bar On and Longino 
would imply. She treats marginalized standpoints as neither innocent nor as the basis of new 
epistemic foundations (as Lazreg and Haraway accuse). Instead, Harding points to the 
importance of turning to the lives of marginalized people to "provide particularly significant 
problems to be explained or research agendas"( 54). She explicitly contrasts standpoint 
epistemology with theories on "the unique abilities of the oppressed to produce knowledge". It is 
the latter of the two that the critics of standpoint theory are describing. Harding argues instead 
that "marginalized lives provide the scientific problems and research agendas- not the solution- for 
the standpoint theories"(62). 
Because it is not an issue of granting epistemic privilege or legitimacy, but rather locating 
a starting point for research agendas, Harding does not need to engage the question of who is 
most oppressed, most marginalized, or further from the center to discover who has the most 
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epistemically legitimate voice. Her theory does not fall into the trap of either looking only at 
oppressions dealing with gender or of ignoring differences within the category of women. 
The subjects/agents of knowledge for feminist standpoint theory are multiple, 
heterogeneous, contradictory and incoherent ... So the logic of the directive to "start 
thought from women's lives" requires that one start one's thought from multiple lives that 
. are in many ways in conflict with each other, each of which itself has multiple and 
contradictory commitments (66). 
Harding deals with the question of difference head on and at the very root of her 
conceptualization of standpoint theory. Rather than presenting a problem for her theory, 
difference is crucial and necessary for her project of strong objectivity. The critiques of 
standpoint theory discussed above are very important but rely on assumptions that feminist 
standpoint epistemology is about determining epistemic legitimacy or privilege. Harding, by 
privileging the standpoints of marginalized peoples in terms of the context of discovery and the 
begii:ming of research questions/agendas avoids these problems and provides an important way for 
maximizing objectivity. She does not present a 'new basis for the truth,' but acknowledges the 
partiality offeminist standpoints and in doing so offers a distinctly postmodem feminist standpoint 
theory. 
Harding's different standpoint epistemology does not have the same methodological 
implications often associated with standpoint theory. Though she argues for starting research 
questions from the perspectives of marginalized standpoints, this does not necessarily mean 
specifically studying, observing or interviewing women. Quantitative methods may be just as 
helpful for answering questions generated from the standpoint of women as qualitative methods. 
Because of this, Harding (1987) explicitly argues against the idea of 'a feminist method' and sees 





















Methodology, Methods and Feminist Research 
Feminists provide a wide variety of epistemological critiques of positivism. The feminist 
empiricists give numerous examples of masculinist biases in conventional research that are not as 
value-neutral or objective as they purport to be. Feminist standpoint theorists argue that 
conventional sociology generates its research questions and analyzes its data from the standpoint 
of those who benefit most from social hierarchies and stratification. They alternatively suggest 
beginning research from the standpoint of women and others who have been traditionally 
marginalized. Finally, feminist postmodernists have severely challenge positivist ideals of 
objectivity, rationality and foundational/absolute knowledge. They demonstrate the social and 
political investedness of all knowl~dge and research and show the impact of the 
knower/researcher on research. These theorists transform the concept of objectivity, separating it 
from value-neutrality and instead associating 'good, objective research' with situated knowledges 
and partial perspective. 
Many ofthese critiques exist only at an abstract or theoretical level and have not made it a 
priority to explain the impact these epistemological positions could or should have on actual 
research processes. For these epistemological positions to have any importance, however, a more 
explicit connection between epistemology and empirical research (and specifically methodology 
and methods) must be made. In the remaining sections of the paper I examine some of the 
debates on feminist methodology in light of the feminist epistemological arguments. 
The debates offeminist methodology and methods take a variety offorms. Some are 
primarily about what constitutes "feminist research" (not necessarily about methodology per se). 
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Other debates are specifically concerned with the ideal overall methodological position offeminist 
social research. One of the most developed aspects of this regards the relationship between the 
researcher and the researched. Finally, some focus on specific methods of social research critique 
or transform conventional methods. This has taken its most extreme form in those who argue for 
a specific feminist method for social research. This generally means a rejection of quantitative 
methods (which are seen as objectifYing and mascu1inist) and a valorization of specific qualitative 
methods, most often semi/un-structured interviews, as the most appropriate for feminist research. 
I argue that the methodological directives about the researcher/researched relationship can 
provide an important corrective to the objectification and detachment that marks much of 
conventional research. This, however, can not be effective if it uses a too uncritical understanding 
of subjectivity and experience. Many of these arguments also focus on feminist research 
exclusively in terms of research on women, at the expense of research done on men and 
masculinity as wen as patriarchal institutions. Finally, I argue against the idea of a 'feminist 
method' and the understandings of quantitative and qualitative research upon which this rests. 
The arguments for a feminist method display a misunderstanding of quantitative methods, 
conflating them with positivist epistemology and ignoring the importance they can have for 
feminist research. It also represents an overly idealistic approach to qualitative methods, ignoring 
problems inherent to this style of research. 
Before moving on to the methodological debates, I think it is useful to outline Sandra 
Harding's (1987) arguments about the distinctions between method, methodology and 
epistemology. She defines 'method' as: specific techniques for gathering evidence. 
'Methodology' is theory and analyses of how research proceeds (or should proceed). 
'Epistemology' is theory of knowledge and is concerned with such questions as: Who can be a 
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'knower?' What can count for knowledge? and What tests must beliefs pass to be considered 
knowledge? (Harding 1987: 7). These three concepts are not entirely discrete and it would be a 
mistake to treat them as completely distinct. In my above analyses of feminist epistemologies, for 
instance, I have included some methodological aspects in order to more concretely connect 
epistemology to actual research processes. Harding's typology, however, is fairly useful for 
distinguishing between various levels of analysis and I will be use it to avoid some of the 
confusion in many methodological debates that results from a failure to distinguish between 
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Feminism and Methodologies 
The arguments for feminist methodologies are attempts to connect the epistemological 
insights about the importance ofthe social location of the knower and the sociohistorical context 
of knowledge and the ways in which researchers have conventionally 'objectified' the research 
subject to concrete research processes. Many feminists attempt to counter research 
objectification through transforming the relationship between the researcher and the researched. 
This represents a movement against the conventionally defined researcher/researched relationship. 
In the conventional model, the researcher strives for a detachment from those she studies, 
minimizing emotional involvement in the research (to decrease bias in the analysis) and attempting 
to have as little impact as possible upon the lives of those she studies (to decrease researcher 
impact on the data collected). Instead many feminist researchers argue for a focus on the 
emotional/affective components of all researcher, viewing an emotional connection as a strength, 
not a weakness (Stanley and Wise 1993; Fonow and Cook 1991; Collins 1991b). They encourage 
engaging not in 'interviewing' but in dialogue in which the researcher reveals aspects about her 
life to those she is studies and in which the researcher herself answers the questions of the 
researched (Oakley 1981). This has even included involving those who are being researched in 
the analysis/interpretative stage of research, in order to grant the researched full subjectivity and 
agency in the research process (Acker, Barry, Esseweld 1991; Kasper 1993). In part, this is an 
attempt to resist the tendency to replicate the extreme power differentials involved in the 
researcher/expert and researched/object relationship (Stanley and Wise 1993). This is also 
implicated in the desire, by some feminist researchers, to enable the research process to be an 





















I believe that these transformations of the relationship between the researcher and 
researched provide interesting new perspectives on women's lives that research done under the 
guise of detachment lacks. In resituating the researched within the research relationship and in 
granting a greater critical and interpretive voice to women researched, feminist sociologists show 
aspects of reality not revealed by those research projects that treat women studied solely as 
research objects with no critical voice of their own. I also believe, however, that these projects 
may be unrealistic about the possibilities of diminishing power differentials in the research 
relationship. I explore this problem in greater depth in my analysis offeminist qualitative research 
projects in the section on 'feminist method.' 
Feminist researchers focus these methodological critiques almost exclusively on qualitative 
research. Many ofthese feminists do not entirely reject the use of quantitative methods, but the 
implications of their methodological and epistemological critiques for doing quantitative research 
remain relatively unexplored. I examine some of these implications in the section on quantitative 
research. 
There are three major methodological issues I examine first. These are: the focus on 
researching women in feminist methodological debates; the idea of empowerment or advocacy 
research; and the question of whether or not there is a 'feminist methodology. ' 
Research on Women 
Implied in the vast majority of debates about feminist research is that it specifically must 
involve researching women. Almost all of the literature on transforming the researcher/researched 
relationship or on using the research process as an arena for empowerment of those researched 






















work from. A great deal is to be learned, of course, from researching women and presenting a 
view of society from the perspectives of various women. There is also, however, a great deal to 
be learned from studying men, masculinity, and social institutions from a feminist perspective; this 
necessitates more than just researching and talking to women. Kelly, Burton, andRegan (1994) 
. present compelling arguments in this regard. They detail their research projects on child sexual 
abuse and domestic violence, which entailed analysis of the institution of social work and of male 
perpetrators offamily violence. They show that, had they only researched women, a great deal of 
what they learned would have been lost or ignored. Studying gender, gender relations and 
patriarchy cannot be equated solely with studying women. To do so would result in a 
perpetuation of the ghettoization offeminist/gender studies as solely a sociology of women 
(Barrett 1987). This ghettoization offeminist research has meant a lack of influence offeminist 
research projects outside of specifically feminist circles and has resulted in what Stacey and 
Thorne (1991) refer to as 'the missing feminist revolution is sociology' This does not necessarily 
mean a rejection offeminist standpoint epistemologies, at least not of the kind advocated by 
Harding (1993); starting research from the perspective of women's lives does not mean only 
studying women's lives. 
Bringing the analysis of masculinity or the analysis of institutions into the research picture 
also raises a number of questions regarding the applicability to this type of research of the 
transformation of the research process many feminist methodologists advocate. Should that sort 
of research be guided by the same directives to empower the researched (if the researched are, for 
instance, convicted rapists) or to bring the researched into the interpretative process? This hardly 
seems likely. The overemphasis on research on women has resulted in an underdevelopment of 





















There are also serious questions that need to be raised about the entire directive to make all 
feminist research empowering to the women studied, and I tum to these questions now. 
Empowerment and Advocacy in Feminist Research 
Another major directive of those advocating feminist methodology is to connect the 
research process to empowerment, advocacy and political action. Patti Lather (1991), drawing on 
the work of Paulo Freire, endorses 'advocacy research' that is focused around praxis. For 
research to be truly feminist, she argues, it must be change-embracing and interactive. The goal 
of this emancipatory research is "to encourage self-reflection and deeper understanding on the 
part of the researched, at least as much as it is to generate empirically grounded theoretical 
knowledge"(60). Similarly, Fonow and Cook (1991) advocate 'consciousness raising' in the 
feminist research process. Lather (1991) also connects the research process to specific 
involvement, on the part of the researcher and the researched, in political/social action that 
challenges the existing social order. Mies (1991) advocates a similar project, speaking of it in 
terms of "the challenge to replace contemplative spectator research with active involvement in 
emancipatory actions and the integration of research into such movements and actions"(67). 
These projects represent an exciting movement to truly perform praxis, to explicitly 
connect feminist social research and feminist politics. We should not, however, be unrealistic 
about the possibilities for connecting individual acts of social change to individual pieces of 
research or ignore the important social research for which such political involvement may not be 
conceptually appropriate. Kelly et aI (1994) point out that, in most cases, participation in a 
research project is unlikely to actually transform the condition of the women/researched's lives; 























lives. Acker et al (1991) question whether or not we always want to 'empower' the researched 
and what this means. They ask "what does 'empowerment' mean when women express overtly 
racist, homophobic and/or classist opinions in a research context?"(I47). Though they 
sympathize with the desire to combine research with empowerment, they note numerous examples 
from their own research in which this can be not only very difficult, but at times, inappropriate. 
There is also a great deal of research for which it makes no conceptual sense to be tied 
directly to a political action. Is feminist research not only to be solely about women (as I 
discussed above), but more specifically about women who want to actively engage in 
emancipatory action? Though there is much to be learned from the type of research endorsed by 
Lather, F onow and Cook, and Mies, limiting feminist research to such projects is a mistake . 
Feminist Methodologies? 
Another question I have about the feminist methodological critiques and the 
arguments about what constitutes 'feminist research' regards the specifically feminist 
nature of it. Some define feminist research in terms of the theories or perspectives used by 
feminist researchers or the questions asked by feminists, not in terms of the methodologies 
used (see for example Reinharz 1990; Harding 1987). Other researchers define feminist 
research specifically around the utilization of specific methodological positions, some of 
whom argue for a specific feminist methodology. Chaftez (in Risman 1993) argues that 
feminist scholarship must: challenge the status quo that devalues women, analyze how 
gender relationships are constructed, and problematize sexual inequality (15). Lentin 
(1993) describes feminist sociological research methodologies as: based on women's 





















position of the researcher, and having a political commitment to the emancipation of 
women (119-20). In these examples, it is clear what makes this specificallyjeminist 
research-- what they are describing is basically a commitment to feminist politics within 
the research process (though it is less clear if these are methodological, rather than 
theoretical, directives). 
In other models offeminist research/methodologies the jeminist nature models is 
less clearly defined. Stanley and Wise (1990) define the specifically feminist nature of the 
research they advocate as: a commitment to a more equal researcher/researched 
relationship, taking into consideration emotion as a research experience, an inclusion of 
the intellectual autobiography of researchers and an acknowledgment of the complex 
question of power in research and writing (23). They definejeminist theory and research 
as: that in which theory is derived from experience, which is continually subject to revision 
in light of that experience and that is accessible to everyone, not just academics (25). 
Fonowand Cook (1991) define feminist methodology as involving a reflexive relationship 
between the researcher and the researched, as having an action orientation, of having an 
emphasis on the affective components of the research act and in using the 'situation at 
hand' or everyday experience to generate research questions. My final example is 
Jayarante and Stewart (1991) who outline 10 criteria that define 'feminist methodology.' 
The first of these is the substantive directive to ask how research can help women's lives 
when selecting a research question. The other nine of these, though, are such things as: 
using appropriate research methods for the topic, trying to combine quantitative and 
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All of the criteria listed by these researchers are beneficial for all research 
(including feminist research), but it is not clear to me what makes these criteria specifically 
feminist or specifically appropriate for feminist research. Because of this, McCormack 
(1989) concludes that "feminist methodology is not radically different from other 
methodologies in the social sciences ... many of the criticisms feminists made about 
methodology in the social sciences had already been made by others"(27). This is not 
what I am arguing. On the contrary, I do believe that feminists have contributed 
numerous unique insights into the nature of the research process. These relate to the 
specific gendered implications of research methodologies and attempts to use various 
methodologies for feminist ends. I agree, however, that though these feminists may offer 
important recommendations concerning what are the most appropriate methodologies for 
feminist research, this does not necessarily constitute a 'feminist methodology.' As 
Marshall (1994) explains about her own methodological directives for Black feminist 
research, "the methods I have been discussing are not exclusive to Black feminism, but 
characterize good praxis"(123). 
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A Feminist Method? 
Some feminists argue not only for a feminist methodology, but also for a distinct feminist 
method. This takes a variety offorms, but is generally characterized by an endorsement of 
qualitative methods (particularly highly collaborative, semi/un-structured interviews) and a 
rejection of quantitative methods. Examples of this position include Kasper's (1994) study of 
women with breast cancer, Oakley's (1981) discussion of the feminist interview process, and 
Cancian's (1992) arguments about 'feminist science.' 
Kasper (1994) argues for placing women at the center of inquiry, for a methodology that 
enables women researched to be active participants in the research process and creates an equal 
relationship between the researcher and the researched. She sees the research subjects as 'expert' 
and respects "each woman's ability to interpret the experiences of her life better than [she] 
could"(273). Kasper recommends against imposing interpretations and research priorities onto 
the voices of women studied. She argues that her recommendations define a 'feminist method', 
that "just as feminism offers a powerful new perspective on social life ... so too can feminism 
create new methods to match its revolutionary perspective"(267). 
Oakley (1981) identifies conventional directives for conducting interview research that 
stress detachment on the part of the 'expert'!researcher as "morally indefensible"(41). Instead, 
she argues for a feminist method focused on the development and identification of common 
concerns between researcher and researched-- a research process marked by non-hierarchical 
























Implicit in defining feminist method solely around (particular forms of) qualitative research 
is a rejection of quantitative methods. Cancian (1992), who does not reject quantitative methods 
entirely, but does see them as much less desirable for feminist research than qualitative methods, 
explains some of the reasons for this. She rejects "positivism's focus on complex quantitative 
data which ... devalues personal experience and everyday knowledge produced by non-elite 
people and defines non-experts as incapable of understanding and controlling their own 
Iives"(624). 
There are a number of difficulties with this position-- both in the assumptions they make 
about their qualitative methods and in their limited view of quantitative methods. The power and 





















Qualitative Methods and Feminist Social Research 
It is important to call into question a number of the assumptions made about the nature 
and possibilities for qualitative research in writings such as Kasper (1993), Cancian (1992) and 
Oakley (1981), that privilege qualitative over quantitative research. The biggest issue regards the 
researcher/researched relationship. These theorists overestimate the degree to which 
identification and rapport between researcher and researched results from a common gender 
identity. There is also a possibility that due to the more intensive relationship between the 
researcher and researched in qualitative interviews and ethnographic field research, there are 
greater possibilities for exploitation. Finally, the eschewal of 'imposing interpretative 
frameworks,' endorsed by Kasper seems neither possible nor desirable. 
A Common Bond Between Women 
The recommendations for an extremely interactive and collaborative research process tend 
to assume a research relationship characterized by common identification and common concerns 
of the researcher and researched in feminist research. They assume that, because women all share 
in the experience of patriarchal culture, gender commonality is enough to automatically create 
good rapport between the researcher and the researched (Shields and Derwin 1993). This, 
Jayarante and Stewart (1991) point out, characterizes an almost exclusive focus on inter-sex 
differences and intra-sex commonalities which can result in differences among women being 
ignored and rendered invisible. Phoenix (1994) demonstrates that the warm and reciprocal 
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identified by Oakley 1981 and Kasper 1993) may not be due solely to a common experience with 
gender, but because of shared class or race on the part of the researcher and the researched (50). 
She argues that because of differing social structural positions and material experiences, "the 
woman interviewer/woman interviewee situation does not always produce rapport through shared 
identification"(55), The discussions of a 'common bond' between researcher and researched due 
to shared gender seem only able to deal with female researchers studying 'women like them' and 
unable to deal with difference. 
This is connected to broader problems in many feminist qualitative studies in terms of class 
and race difference. Cannon, Higginbotham and Lewy (1991) argue that although feminist 
qualitative studies on women have produced a great deal of important information, this 
information has too often excluded women of color and working class women (107). This is 
results from a variety of causes. Part of this is because white feminist researchers have been too 
willing to study only white middle class women and have traditionally displayed a general 
inattention to the relationships between gender, race, and class, Cannon et al (1991) also point 
out, though, that qualitative studies are often biased because of the greater willingness of white, 
middle class subjects (who may be more trusting of the researcher and of the potential uses of 
research) to participate in qualitative research, If those focusing on a 'feminist method' continue 
to only stress the commonalities among women, ignoring differences of race, class and other 
factors, their method will be an extremely limited one. 
Vulnerability and Exploitation in Qualitative Research 
One of the arguments against the use of quantitative methods in feminist research is that 
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researched are not actively integrated into the interpretive process, it objectifies and exploits the 
women studied. On the other hand, the qualitative methods they endorse, because of the greater 
emotional connections between researcher and researched and the more personally involved 
research process, are considered empowering and non-exploitative. Stacey (1987) and Acker, 
Barry and Esseweld (1991) demonstrate, however, that there may be equal, if not greater, dangers 
of exploiting the researched .in qualitative research. 
Judith Stacey (1987) relates important concerns about the dangers of exploitation of 
research subjects in qualitative research, documenting difficulties she encountered in her 
ethnographic research of families in post-industrial America. She explains that initially 
ethnographic methods seemed ideal for feminist research because ethnography/participant 
observation emphasizes the experiential, has a contextual and interpersonal approach to 
knowledge and a stronger relationship to research subjects than found in other research methods . 
She found, however, that this "appearance of greater respect for and equality with research 
subjects in the ethnographic approach may mask a deeper more dangerous form of 
exploitation"(22) than found in other methods. This is because, the researched are more 
vulnerable, due to the greater intimacy with and deeper involvement of the researcher in the lives 
of the research subjects; the decisions made by the researcher can have a more.intense (negative) 
impact on the actual lives of the researched and the potential for exploitation is heightened. 
Acker et al (1991) discuss similar problems with the deeper relationship between 
researcher and researched in qualitative (as opposed to survey) interviews. They argue that while 
developing friendships and emotional connection with the researched can have positive effects, 




















friendships to the end of gaining information. There never is an entirely equal relationship 
between the researcher and the researched. Proceeding as ifthere is a completely non-hierarchical 
relationship. "Given that the power differences between researcher and researched cannot be 
completely eliminated, attempting to create a more equal relationship can paradoxically be more 
exploitative"(141 ). 
Neither Stacey (1987) nor Acker et al (1991) entirely reject attempts to develop 
interactive, collaborative qualitative methodologies because of these problems. They do 
demonstrate, however, that the assumptions made by many feminist methodologists regarding the 
researcher/researched relationship need to be challenged. The type of 'feminist method' endorsed 
by researchers like Oakley (1981) and Kasper (1993) ignores many dangers associated with their 
methods, thereby severely limiting the desirability of the type of projects they endorse. 
Interpretative Frameworks and Abstract Analysis 
One of the fundamental difficulties with the assumptions Kasper (1994) and Oakley (1981) 
make about feminist methods concerns the directive not to 'impose' the researchers' frameworks 
on the experience of the researched. This seems neither possible nor desirable. Acker et al 
(1991) explain that, though focusing on the experience ofthe researched through their own eyes 
is important, research cannot end there. 
Ultimately, the researcher must objectny the experience of the researched, must 
translate that experience into more abstract and general terms if an analysis that links the 
individual to processes outside her immediate social world is to be achieved. (136) 
Thus, the idea that research can or should avoid any level of abstraction or 'imposition' of 
theoretical frameworks onto the experiences of the researched seems antithetical to producing 
quality research; indeed it seems detrimental to the feminist project of linking the personal 
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experiences of women to a broader politics. Even if this were desirable, it is never truly possible. 
Sprague and Zimmerman (1992) point out that even if a researcher desired solely to present the 
ideas and views of the researched, with no analysis by the researcher, they are still utilizing their 
own interpretative and theoretical frameworks in deciding who to talk to and what words to 
include. 
Barbara Risman (1993) provides an excellent example of a feminist researcher who utilizes 
both quantitative and qualitative methods and who very explicitly 'imposes her frameworks' upon 
the voices and experiences of those she researches. Under the guidelines of feminist research 
presented by Oakley (1981) and Kasper (1993) her research could not be considered feminist; 
however, her research questions arise from her position as a feminist, her analysis incorporates 
feminist perspectives and should definitely be considered a piece offeminist research. In one of 
her research projects, she studies sorority girls and their understandings of who a sorority girl is 
and what are the appropriate criteria for membership. These criteria are almost exclusively 
concerned with physical appearance and perceptions of social class; this, she explains, represents 
an internalization, on the part of the sorority girls, of dominant societal norms about gender, 
appearance, and class. Her conclusions and her feminist analysis are the specific result of not 
simply taking at face value the interpretations of those she researched (who probably would not 
agree with her analysis), and instead of using 'external' theoretical frameworks to understand the 
experiences and perspectives of the sorority girls, As Risman concludes: 
We certainly have more contact with our subjects while doing qualitative research, but 
that doesn't mean that we are any less detached from the analysis, nor that we should be. 
Qualitative research does not allow us to avoid imposing analytic frameworks upon our 



















Those researchers who, in the interests of developing a feminist method, want to avoid 
inserting their own perspectives into the analysis of the experience of the researched may actually 
share in many positivist assumptions about the research process. Clearly there are enormous 
differences-- those arguing for a feminist method reject the politics/science dichotomy and 
conceptualize the research process very differently than conventional positivists. They share some 
assumptions with the positivists, though, in that they do not acknowledge the crucial impact of the 
location (socially and theoretically) of the researcher on the research. Like some positivists they 
seem to assume that analysis or interpretation simply arises out of the data if they use careful 
enough methods (though of course their methodological criteria may differ dramatically from 
those of most positivists). This seems quite contrary to the many feminist epistemological 
explanations of the research process regarding the social construction of knowledge and the 




















Quantitative Methods and Feminist Social Research 
The assumptions of those proposing a 'feminist method' are problematic not only regarding 
feminist qualitative research, but also in terms of understanding quantitative methods. In these 
discussions, quantitative methods are often equated with positivist epistemology; this inaccurately 
conflates the two issues. Their rejection of quantitative methods ignores many of the important 
advantages quantitative methods can have in explanatory research and for generalization. Finally, 
to reject quantitative methods in sociology, a discipline dominated by quantitative research, can 
only result in a further ghettoization of feminist sociological research and compliance with a lack 
of impact of feminist perspectives on research produced by quantitative researchers. It is 
important for the potential feminist uses of all research methods, including quantitative methods, 
to be explored and utilized. 
Positivist Epistemology and Quantitative Methods 
Many feminists reject quantitative methods because they connect them to positivism; they 
view quantitative methods as the natural result of positivist epistemology or positivism is seen as 
inherent to quantitative methods, I believe, however, that one can reject the epistemology of 
positivism and still use quantitative methods. Positivism and quantitative research, though 
historically linked, are not intrinSically linked (Maynard 1994). The use of survey research, for 
instance, does not need to be accompanied by a lack of understanding of the social construction of 
knowledge, the impact of the location of the researcher on choosing research questions and 















Zimmennan (1992) demonstrate that those endorsing the exclusive use of a qualitative feminist 
method tend to describe qualitative research as it might be practiced ideally, yet describe 
quantitative methods in tenns of its most problematic potential uses. Quantitative methods should 
not necessarily be rejected because of its problematic history and past anti-feminist uses, any more 
than qualitative methods should be rejected because of the historical relationship between 
ethnography and colonialism (Mies 1991: 67). 
Risman (1993) argues that to reject quantitative methods because of a connection to 
problems with scientific method or positivism is analogous to 'throwing the out the baby with the 
bathwater'; I wholeheartedly agree with this position. The extreme concentration on quantitative 
versus qualitative methods in much of the literature on feminist methods "obscures the more 
fundamental challenge offeminism to the traditional 'scientific method' ... That challenge really 
questions the epistemology or theory of knowledge underlying traditional science"(Jayarante and 
Stewart 1991: 101), rather than necessitating the adoption or rejection of anyone method. 
The rejection of quantitative research because of its association with positivism may be 
another instance offeminist methodologists sharing in some of the assumptions of positivism. 
Sprague and Zimmennan (1992) explain that, just as positivism collapses epistemology and 
methodology into 'the scientific method,' those rejecting quantitative methods assume an 
inseparable link between the denial of the possibility of objective research (an epistemological 
position) with a denial of the desirability of quantitative studies (a method). The feminist 
methodologists do not sufficiently challenge the positivist assumption that 'scientific method' is 





















Feminist Quantitative Research 
Those who focus exclusively on the use of qualitative methods for feminist research ignore 
the specific advantages that quantitative methods offer for some research projects. One of these 
is the larger sample population possible in survey research. Due to financial and time constraints 
there are serious limits to the number of people that can be observed or interviewed in qualitative 
research. Because of the less intensive (but broader) focus of many quantitative research projects, 
larger and broader samples can be included in quantitative studies. This is particularly helpful for 
studying differences among women-- an important project in feminist research. Qualitative 
studies provide a greater amount of information about a smaller number of people, whereas 
quantitative research enables discovery of more general and less detailed information about a 
greater number of people. Both have tradeoffs, but both also have advantages for feminist 
research. 
A related issue is that of generalization. Survey research methods utilize strict sampling 
techniques to obtain the most representative a sample possible. The data obtained from these 
samples, unlike qualitative samples which are rarely truly representative, provides a greater ability 
to generalize the findings to a broader population. This ability may is especially important for 
convincing policy makers and others about the scope of problems; therefore survey research can 
be an important contribution to feminist politics (Reinharz 1992). 
The greater control and precision of quantitative methods is extremely important in 
establishing causal relationships between factors. Qualitative research is more helpful for 
exploratory research projects and useful for exploring new areas of inquiry and developing new 





















which quantitative methods are particularly suited, however, are equally important for producing 
feminist knowledge and furthering our understanding of gender and patriarchy. 
Finally, quantitative methods may be less suited to the use of interactionist and 
ethnomethodological frameworks and for understanding how actors produce meaning in their 
everyday lives. However, quantitative methods have a number of advantages over qualitative 
research for studying structural issues. Macro-structural analysis is crucial to studying the system 
. of patriarchy and other societal institutions and for connecting individual experiences to broader 
social trends. A feminist sociology that utilized only qualitative methods and studied only micro-
interactionist issues would be a limited one indeed .. 
Reinharz (1993) comments that from reading a great deal offeminist methodological 
literature one might assume that there is no such thing as a feminist quantitative sociologist. The 
important contributions quantitative feminist sociologists have made to our understanding of 
work, family, education and other social institutions are, she explains, 'neglected voices' in 
feminist methodological literature. Because of the advantages of quantitative research for 
generalization and studying structural issues, Jayarante and Stewart (1991) and Sprague and 
Zimmerman (1992) argue, as I do, that the use and further development of quantitative research is 
crucial for developing feminist knowledge and feminist politics. 
I also am concerned with the effects that an over -reliance on qualitative methods can have 
on attempts to communicate the knowledge generated in feminist research to researchers outside 
of the feminist community. Because so much of sociology is guided by quantitative research, the 
impact feminism can have on transforming sociology as a whole would be seriously diminished, if 
feminists were only to use the qualitative feminist methods endorsed by Oakley (1981), Kasper 
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(1993), Cancian (1992) and others. The focus on only a few specific methods can result, and 
possibly has resulted, in a ghettoization of feminist research, which can only have negative effects. 
Using only specific qualitative 'feminist methods' and avoiding engagement with the potential 
positive uses of quantitative research would results in a complicity with the non-feminism of many 
traditional (quantitatively focused) fields of study. 
Instead of attempting to blend a number of different methods or attempting to locate the 
feminist uses of all research methods (as Maynard and Puries 1994, Jayarante and Stewart 1991, 
and Sprague and Zimmerman 1992 do), those advocating only one specific feminist method 
polarize various methodological options as either exclusively good or bad. Sprague and 
Zimmerman (1992) argue that, though these feminists may try to overcome dualisms of 
subject/object, rational/emotional, male/female they (like those who only value quantitative 
methods) perpetuate and strengthen the dualism of quantitative/qualitative. This is completely at 
odds with feminist epistemological directives to deconstruct dualist thinking and can only have 
deleterious effects on the future of feminist research . 
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A short while ago, someone who had just heard me explain my thesis asked me 
how the conclusions I have reached in writing this thesis have influenced my own views on 
and use of research, especially considering I am currently engaged in quantitative analysis. 
To this question, I flippantly answered: 'It hasn't.' And yet, if these theoretical and 
epistemological positions about research and knowledge do not have a connection to how 
we really do research, then there is very little point in engaging further with these debates. 
I would like to conclude with a discussion of how I think the issues I've discussed in my 
thesis can and will influence my own role as a researcher. 
I turn first to the methodological debates I examined in the second half of the 
thesis. Another mend of mine remarked to me some time ago: "Isn't it ironic that you're 
writing your thesis on feminist methodology and yet taking a data analysis class at the 
same time?" To her, the two projects seemed utterly contradictory. Ifthere is any point 
to the latter half of my thesis, it is specifically to counter this assumption. 
Certainly there is a lot to gain from the type of qualitative research projects 
endorsed by many feminist methodologists; though I have critiqued a number of their 
assumptions, I do believe that, as one of many research options, sociology is benefited by 
their attempts to transform the research relationship, grant women a greater critical voice, 
and take seriously the subjective experiences of the researched. This type of research by 
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project for that matter. One of the crucial tasks for contemporary sociologists is 
integrating 'micro' and 'macro' level analyses. To do this requires not only intensive 
examination of the experiences and subjectivities of individual women, but also critical 
examination of broader structural phenomena. The use of quantitative methods will be an 
important resource for feminists in this project Thus, survey research and the use of 
statistical methods are not only defensible, but necessary for feminist sociology. For these 
reasons, I do not find any contradiction between my use of statistical data analysis and my 
interest in feminist methodology. 
The questions still remains of how the epistemological positions I examined in the 
first half of the thesis inform my own research. For some feminist sociologists, accepting 
the critiques of positivist epistemology offered by postmodem feminists and feminist 
standpoint theorists results in the sole identification of certain qualitative methods as 
feminist. For me, however, the critiques of positivism most certainly do not lead in this 
direction. Indeed the criticisms of dualistic thinking offered by the postmodernists cause 
me to be extremely wary of basing a methodology around a strict quantitative vs, 
qualitative dichotomy (Sprague and Zimmerman 1992). 
Though quantitative research has traditionally been connected with positivist 
epistemology, this is not an inseverable connection (and we must also remember that use 
of qualitative methods does.not make one immune to the problems of objectivism and 
positivism). Any quantitative research in which I participate, at least, will be highly 
influenced by the work of the feminist postmodernists. Quantitative research, because 


















subjects, can be extremely prone to the problems of impersonality and detachment; these 
are issues that need further examination by quantitative feminist sociologists. Other 
epistemological issues seem to have as much potential connection to the use of 
quantitative methods as any other methods. The questions I ask in my (quantitative) 
research and the theoretical perspectives I tum towards to help explain my data, are of 
course shaped by my socio-historical position; my research, like all other research, is not 
bias/value-free. Nor do I conceptualize my research in terms of foundations of absolute 
knowledge; by asking a particular question or turning to a particular data source, we 
necessarily leave others out. This does not mean, however, conceding that all (partial) 
knowledges are equally valid. If! truly believed this, it would be difficult to imagine why I 
would engage in any research at all. 
One might still ask, if the epistemological critiques of positivism can be compatible 
with quantitative method, then why do we find so few feminist quantitative researchers 
actively engaging in the feminist methodological debates? In researching my thesis, I did 
have trouble locating quantitative researchers who offer explicit contributions to the 
epistemological and methodological debates in feminism (Jayarante and Stewart 1991, 
Risman 1993, Molm 1992, and Kelly et al1991 being exceptions to this). This, however, 
may be less the result of a lack of attention to the issue and more the result of the 
constraints of publishing in journals that may be highly unsympathetic to lengthy 
epistemological and feminist theoretical discussions. Publishing in journals that are not 
specifically feminist, though, will be of utmost importance if feminist theory is to move 
beyond 'convincing the convinced.' Quantitative feminist researchers may also be 
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reluctant to engage in the feminist methodological debates because their methods have 
been so entirely devalued by other feminists who consider their work unfeminist or amoral. 
It is my hope that feminist quantitative researchers will begin to engage more 
deeply and explicitly with the epistemological and methodological implications for doing 
feminist research. This will be of utmost importance both for translating the 
epistemological debates into methodological directives and for moving feminist 
methodology beyond the over -simplistic assumptions about quantitative and qualitative 
research that have dominated so much of this debate thus far. 
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